Firm characteristics and the cyclicality of R&D investments by Arvanitis, Spyros & Woerter, Martin
Industrial and Corporate Change, Volume 23, Number 5, pp. 1141–1169
doi:10.1093/icc/dtt013
Advance Access published May 23, 2013
Firm characteristics and the cyclicality of
R&D investments
Spyros Arvanitis* and Martin Woerter**,y
The aim of this study is to combine micro-aspects of firm behavior with macro
aspects of business development and identify market conditions (e.g. price com-
petition) and firm characteristics (e.g. type of R&D partners) that enable a firm to
have a pro-cyclical, anti-cyclical, or non-systematic R&D investment behavior. The
empirical results confirm to large extent a series of hypotheses as to innovation-
relevant firm characteristics that underline the three different behavior categories
and allow us to make profiles of the three types of R&D behavior.
JEL classification: E32, L23, O31.
1. Introduction
There is some theoretical consent (see Bernanke and Gertler, 1989, Barlevy, 2007)
and some empirical evidence (see Guellec and Ioannidis, 1999; Mairesse et al., 1999;
Rammer et al., 2004; Quyang 2011a) that R&D investment expenditures of firms are
pro-cyclical, i.e. they are increasing in the business upswing, and they are decreasing
in the business downturn. However, there are also some theoretical arguments as well
as some anecdotical evidence that firms show an anti-cyclical R&D investment
behavior. Such investment behavior is advantageous not only for the respective
firm but also for the economy as a whole, as anti-cyclical investment behavior
might mitigate the negative implications of the cyclical movement of the economy
such as strong employment fluctuation.
Therefore, there is scope for an analysis that takes as starting point a picture
of real situations that is more heterogeneous than that prescribed in the “pure”
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pro-cyclical or “pure” anti-cyclical point of view. Hence, it is the aim of this study to
combine micro-aspects of firm behavior with macro-aspects of business development
and identify market circumstances (e.g. competition) and firm characteristics (e.g.
type of R&D partners) that enable a firm to have an anti-cyclical or unsystematic
R&D investment behavior.
To explain pro- or anti-cyclical R&D behavior, we have to take into account two
diverging forces, namely, (i) demand aspects (see Filippetti and Archibugi, 2011) and
(ii) the “opportunity cost” aspect. As R&D investments are predominantly financed
through the cash-flow of a firm, which is expected to fluctuate pro-cyclically with
demand, we would expect a pro-cyclical R&D investment behavior as well. If the
“opportunity cost” aspect prevails, we would expect the contrary; firms would make
use of lower production costs in recessions and would intensify their R&D invest-
ments. As a consequence, this would not only make R&D activities cheaper but also
increase the probability to market new products in the business upswing, when
markets are in general more receptive for new products. Hence, our theoretical
notions are around these two aspects, and we want to figure out under which cir-
cumstances firms are able to follow the opportunity cost approach and when finan-
cial restrictions are likely to be dominant and firms show pro-cyclical R&D
investment behavior.
Based on firm-level panel data for manufacturing firms in Switzerland comprising
three waves (2002, 2005, 2008) of the Swiss Innovation Survey and aggregated yearly
data (three-digit level) for the business cycles development in Switzerland (1999–
2009), we could identify important firm characteristics and market conditions that
are responsible for anti-cyclical R&D investment behavior of firms. In sum, we could
learn that firms can benefit from low opportunity costs through anti-cyclical R&D
investments (compared with unsystematic R&D investment behavior) if they have a
relatively large sales share of R&D expenditures, if they have external R&D relation-
ships, if they are not exposed to intensive price competition (e.g. operating in inter-
national market niches), if they belong to high-tech industries, and if they are
relatively large. If we compare anti-cyclical firms with pro-cyclical firms, at least
three factors are important. Anti-cyclical firms have larger sales shares of R&D in-
vestments, they are less frequently cooperating with universities, and they are not
exposed to intensive price competition.
From a policy point of view, the results indicate that innovation policy can con-
tribute to mitigate the cyclical fluctuation of R&D investments through considering
the just mentioned factors in their promotion activities. This would not only help
firms make use of lower opportunity costs at recessions but also contribute to
dampen the overall business fluctuation.
The article is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes the most important
findings in the existing literature and introduces our theoretical framework and
subsequent hypotheses. Section 3 discusses the data. Section 4 presents the main
facts with respect to R&D and the business cycle development in Swiss
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manufacturing in the period 1999–2009. Section 5 discusses the empirical setting.
Section 6 presents the results and Section 7 concludes.
2. Literature review and hypotheses
The literature on the relationship between innovation activities and business cycle
development is comprehensive. In what follows, we want to identify important firm-
level and industry-level factors that explain pro-cyclical or anti-cyclical behavior with
respect to R&D investment.
2.1 Theoretical arguments and evidence in favour of pro-cyclical behavior
2.1.1 The argument of the dominant role of demand factors
Although Schmookler (1966) emphasized demand-side factors as important driving
factors for innovation activities, Schumpeter (1942) emphasized supply-side factors.
It appears that both components are important (see Arvanitis and Hollenstein, 1994,
for evidence for Switzerland). If we think of great technological inventions, such as
biotechnology and nanotechnology, or important elements of Information and
Communication Technology (e.g. World Wide Web, personal computers), it is
clear that they caused a bunch of follow-on innovations that have created promising
markets. Following Schmookler (1966), such innovations are more likely if the econ-
omy is booming, and they are less likely if demand is shrinking. In case innovation
activities are predominantly financed by cash-flow, innovation activities are likely to
be pro-cyclical. Geroski and Glegg (1997) found a positive relationship between
demand and major innovations (or patents), but a less clear link between R&D
investment and demand, as the fluctuations of R&D investments are limited by
high adjustment costs.1 Also Piva and Vivarelli (2007, 2009) found a significant
demand-pull effect for innovations if companies are liquidity constrained. For
Switzerland, especially, the development of export markets (demand) show a positive
relationship with innovation success of Swiss firms (see Woerter and Roper, 2010).
Quyang (2011b) develops a simple model showing that higher persistence of R&D
investment raises the cyclical response in innovation’s marginal expected return,
which in turn reduces the dominance of marginal opportunity cost (see further
later in the text), and therefore drives R&D pro-cyclical. The theoretical argument
is supported by empirical evidence based on a panel of US industries in the period
1958–1998.
1 Geroski and Walters (1995) found that innovation activities are pro-cyclical. However, Collins and
Yao (1998) showed that the Granger-causality test in Geroski and Walters (1995) shows some flaws.
Collins and Yao (1998) used a VAR model and could not find any causality between innovation and
business cycle based on the same data set as Geroski and Walters (1995).
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2.1.2 The financial restraints argument
Hall (1992) found a positive elasticity between R&D investments and cash-flow,
controlling, among other factors, also for demand; she concludes that financial re-
straints rather than demand fluctuation prevent firms from R&D investments.
Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) also found good reasons that cash-flow is import-
ant for R&D investments. They stated that earlier studies did not find an effect of
internal finance on R&D investments, as they predominantly looked at large firms.
Large firms are less likely to be financially constrained compared with smaller firms.
They themselves investigated small high-tech firms. Also, Blundell et al. (1999)
argued that internal sources of funding are of particular importance for investments
in R&D. Mairesse et al. (1999) emphasized that causality between cash-flow and
R&D investments goes both ways. This suggests that both pre-innovation rents as
well as post-innovation rents are important for R&D investments. Huergo and
Moreno (2011) found that R&D investments are directly linked to past firm per-
formance. As both internal finance and firm performance are likely to be pro-cyclical,
R&D investments are expected to be pro-cyclical as well. Lerner (2010: 30) concludes
based on the results of several studies that “Anglo-Saxon” economies are more sen-
sitive or show a greater responsiveness of R&D to cash-flow than then economies of
continental European countries. This greater responsiveness of R&D may arise be-
cause they are financially constrained in the sense that they view external financial
resources as expensive (high expectations of rates of returns from investors). In
Germany, the correlation between cash flow and R&D investments seems to be
stronger for smaller firms compared with larger ones. Rammer et al. (2004) stated
for Germany that SMEs are stronger affected by business cycle fluctuations than
larger firms. However, the R&D expenditures of SMEs show a more moderate reac-
tion on turnover than large firms. Some rigidity on the R&D employment level may
be responsible for this observed effect, as a further reduction of R&D activities—that
are already on a low level—could mean to shut down R&D.
2.1.3 The role of the “sunk cost” character of R&D investment
The outcomes of R&D activities are not a product that can be easily traded. To some
extent they are “sunk” investments, and they cannot be sold easily until they resulted
in a product. It is also costly to stop a project and continue it at a later moment.
Research knowledge has tacit components; it roots in the mind of single researchers.
If they leave the firm, the knowledge is gone too. This may be especially true for firms
with a few specialized researchers. Hence, R&D expenditures are expected to fluctu-
ate less with the business cycle than sales of innovative products. Nevertheless,
Guellec and Ioannidis (1999) based on industry-level data as well as Rammer et al.
(2004) based on firm-level data found a positive relationship between turnover
(sales) and R&D expenditures. Also Mairesse et al. (1999) stated a positive relation-
ship between market growth and R&D expenditures. This may be due to the cash-
flow effect. Cash-flow plays an important role for R&D investments.
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2.1.4 The information asymmetry argument
Arrow (1962) has already used R&D investments as an example for moral hazard, as
the output of R&D activities can never be predicted from the input (see Arrow, 1962:
172). Furthermore, there is greater information asymmetry between potential in-
vestors and researchers. It should be easier for researchers to assess the likelihood
of technological success of R&D projects compared with investors, as the latter lack
detailed information and experience with respect to the research processes.
Therefore, it is difficult for investors to distinguish good from bad projects (“lemon
problem”). In case the information asymmetry is too great, a market for R&D in-
vestments may disappear at all. Information asymmetry is expected to fluctuate with
the business cycle (see Bernanke and Gertler, 1989). The information asymmetry or
principle-agent problem is alleviated if the net worth of the borrower increases, as
financial distress causes higher agency costs. As borrowers’ net worth is pro-cyclical,
there will be a decline in agency costs in booms and an increase in recessions. The
pro-cyclicality of agency costs tends to make external R&D investments pro-cyclical
as well.
These theoretical findings were confirmed by Aghion et al. (2008) for France.
The authors argued that information asymmetries prevented French firms from
increasing their investments in business downturn.
2.2 Arguments and evidence in favor of anti-cyclical behavior
2.2.1 The opportunity cost argument
It is expected that costs for labor and other input factors for R&D activities would be
high in a booming phase of an economy and low in a recession phase. Hence,
opportunity costs are lower in recessions, and firms would benefit if they could
shift resources to R&D activities. If the economy improves and demand increases,
firms could launch the new products and benefit from these investments. Aghion and
Saint-Paul (1998) stated that R&D activities would be anti-cyclical if costs are pro-
cyclical. Also, Barlevy (2007) argued that based on opportunity costs consideration,
rational firm behavior would cause R&D to be anti-cyclical. Rafferty and Funk
(2004) found that opportunity-cost effects are more likely for firms with large
R&D budgets.
2.2.2 The argument of rent displacement
Rent displacement refers to the fear that introducing a new innovation will displace
earnings from existing products. As earnings of existing products are expected to be
low in recessions, or even to dry up, resistance to introduce newer products or new
versions of existing products may be lower (see Geroski and Glegg, 1997). Thus, it
should be easier to introduce innovations toward the end of recessions or the
beginning of the upswing. This would make innovation activities anti-cyclical.
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2.2.3 The role of technological opportunities
Firms are doing research in different technological fields. Some of them are fields
with greater potential—so-called high-technological opportunity fields; others show
a lower potential—so-called low-technological opportunity fields. Brouwer and
Kleinknecht (1999) argued that innovators in high-opportunity fields have fewer
problems with demand shocks or with financing R&D activities in recessions than
innovators in fields with a low potential. They assume that this is related to market
power, as they found little effects for firms that concentrate their R&D in certain
technological fields (e.g. information technology, new materials technology, or bio-
technology). However, technological opportunities are likely to be strongly related
with R&D effort. Dugal and Morbey (1995) found that firms with larger R&D in-
vestments are suffering less from sales declines during recessions than firms with
small R&D investments. They found that470% of firms that spent45% of their sales
in R&D experienced even a sales increase in recession. Tang (2002) analysed this
issue at country level and found that technical process reduces growth volatility.
However, also “competitive effect” could be possible, as Rammer et al. (2004)
found for Germany that a change in world-wide research intensity of an industry
has a negative effect on R&D expenditures of German firms in those technology
fields. This means that R&D dynamics in Germany took place in industries that are
not characterized through a strong increase in international R&D.
2.2.4 The role of R&D collaborations
R&D collaboration could decrease the fixed costs for R&D projects, as firms can
make use, for example, of the technological infrastructure of the collaboration part-
ners or they can share the “sunk costs” in developing project-specific new know-
ledge.2 Consequently, R&D collaboration would increase the flexibility of R&D
investments, and firms could better adapt R&D investments to their cash-flow.
This would render R&D investment pro-cyclical. However, if R&D collaborations
are strategically motivated aiming, for example, at investment in new promising
technologies or the involvement of potential competitors in common projects,
then flexibility would be decreased, as firms would fear to miss an opportunity if
they reduce their investment in such collaborations in recessions, as it would be
difficult to revitalize them later. Looking at Switzerland, empirical investigations
show that strategic motives for R&D cooperation (such as utilization of technological
synergies and access to specialized technology) have been considerably more frequent
than cost motives (such as saving of R&D costs and shortening of development time)
(Arvanitis, 2012). Consequently, it is likely that R&D collaboration would rather
provide incentives for an anti-cyclical R&D investment behavior.
2 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.
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2.3 The role of competition
Competition is a further important factor for explaining pro- or anti-cyclicality of
R&D investment. Starting with a Schumpeterian point of view (see Schumpeter,
1942), concentrated markets, which firms have some market power, are more
likely to have internal financial means that are sufficient for financing their R&D
activities than less concentrated ones. But do such firms have incentives for R&D?
Lacking competitive pressure, large firms may tend to be overcautious and bureau-
cratic and as a consequence less innovative. Especially in “bad” times, they are likely
to protect their markets rather than expand them through innovative products. This
could be an argument that competition fosters innovative activities (see Geroski and
Glegg, 1997). However, firms in an atomistic type of competitive environment may
not have access to sufficient financial means (internal and external) for permanent
R&D activities. Thus, they may also refrain from innovation activities especially in
recessions, when sales and cash-flow are likely to be low. This leads us to the view
that neither monopoly nor atomistic competition is likely to be the most favorable
competitive environment for innovation; an oligopolistic market with a few R&D-
active firms seems to be the most favorable operating field for innovative firms. In a
more stylized form, we would consider an “inverted U-shape” relationship between
competition and innovation performance. The findings in Aghion et al. (2005) make
it plausible that R&D expenditures in oligopolistic markets are likely to remain
considerably high even during recessions.
2.4 The role of labor costs
Factor costs are usually higher in an expanding economy and lower during recessions.
Labor costs show some special characteristics. First, labor supply is usually rather
stable (or only slowly changing). A lack of skilled people could negatively affect the
R&D activities of firms. Consequently, firms are motivated to “hoard” highly skilled
expensive workers in recessions to have their knowledge available in the upswing.3 In
a booming economy, labor shortage and greater labor costs are more likely, and firms
can switch personnel resources into more market-related activities (e.g. sales and
marketing). Hence, R&D employment in the economic downturn is relatively high,
whereas it is relatively low in the booming period. In sum, this would suggest an anti-
cyclical R&D employment effect. However, empirically the opposite has been
observed. Rammer et al. (2004) found that R&D personnel show a pro-cyclical de-
velopment over time. This result suggests that liquidity constrains matter more than
the opportunity of relatively cheap R&D activities. However, they also found that
R&D personnel fluctuate less than R&D expenditures along a business cycle. This is
related to the aforementioned argument that firms cannot afford to loose skilled
people and their specific (tacit) knowledge during a recession.
3 We thank an anonymous referee for this point.
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As there is some rigidity in R&D labor fluctuations, it is unlikely that
salaries would drop significantly during recessions. In contrast, sales are more vola-
tile during a business cycle. This suggests that R&D personnel—although more ex-
pensive in expansive economies—could be financed easier in good times than in
recessions. This also contributes to the pro-cyclicality of R&D employment. If labor
supply is fluctuating (pro-cyclical), then Barlevy (2007) argued that R&D behavior is
pro-cyclical, too, although opportunity costs would push for anti-cyclical R&D
activities.
2.5 Summing up: resulting hypotheses
In sum, we discussed a number of factors that have a pro-cyclical or anti-cyclical
effect on R&D investments or innovative behavior. Although demand factors and
cash-flow clearly work for a pro-cyclical effect of innovation behavior, opportunity
costs and rent displacement are clearly anti-cyclical. High technological opportu-
nities and more “oligopolistic” type of competition increase the R&D intensity of
firms and also make R&D expenditures less dependent on fluctuating sales. Labor
supply can show pro-cyclical as well as anti-cyclical effects, depending on the em-
ployment and wage flexibility of firms. If flexibility is low and sales fluctuate strongly
with the business cycle, then R&D employment is likely to be pro-cyclical. Whether
R&D investments or innovations are pro-cyclical or anti-cyclical depends on the just
mentioned factors. As restraints in financial means are expected to affect behavior
stronger than the “opportunity effect” (see Rafferty and Funk, 2008), one could
expect some tendency for pro-cyclical fluctuation. However, what holds at the end
is an empirical question. Based on available data and the literature, we will test
empirically the following hypotheses that are derived from the discussion in
Section 2:
Anti-cyclical behavior:
(a) A good past demand development increases the financial opportunities of firms
and hence, enables firms to invest anti-cyclically in R&D (as measured by the
sales share of R&D expenditures) in the future.
(b) Larger firms are more likely to finance R&D internally, and they should be less
dependent on short-term market fluctuations. Hence, they are likely to exploit
opportunity costs and invest anti-cyclically in R&D.
(c) External R&D cooperation increases the flexibility of R&D activities of a firm.
Hence, it is expected that such firms are more likely to make use of opportunity
costs. They are more likely to invest anti-cyclically in R&D.
(d) It is expected that firms with larger sales share of R&D investments would suffer
less from sales declines during recessions than firms with (relatively) small R&D
budgets. Hence, such firms are likely to invest anti-cyclically to make use of
opportunity costs.
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Pro-cyclical behavior:
(e) Firms with intensive price competition in their main markets are likely to have
difficulties to finance their R&D, as their price-cost margins are expected to be
low. In good business times, they are expected to have fewer problems to finance
R&D. Hence, their investment behavior is expected to be pro-cyclical.
(f) High average personnel costs point at well-educated and experienced staff that is
not easily substituted, if once they are dismissed. Hence, firms have the tendency
to keep their “expensive” high-qualified R&D employees. Clearly, such person-
nel could be financed easier in good times than in recessions. This would point
to pro-cyclicality of R&D investments. Hence, firms with great average person-
nel costs are likely to invest pro-cyclically.
3. Data
We used two sources of data for this investigation. First, we used data at industry
level on the cyclical movement of business activity in the period 1999–2009 in Swiss
manufacturing. These data are stemming from the monthly Swiss Business Survey
(see http://www.kof.ethz.ch/en/surveys/business-tendency-surveys/manufacturing/)
and were first aggregated to three-digit industry level (30 industries) and then trans-
formed to annual data (average of monthly data). The original data at firm level are
measured on a three-level ordinal scale (positive change, negative change, no
change). Through the aggregation, the ordinal scale data are transformed to
pseudo-metrical data. We constructed a composite indicator of business activity
based on the following three single indicators of business activity: “incoming orders”,
“production,” and “order backlog” (see Table 1).
Second, we used firm-level data of three waves (2002, 2005, 2008) of the Swiss
Innovation Survey (see http://www.kof.ethz.ch/en/surveys/structural-surveys/innov-
ation-survey/). The survey yields information on the R&D expenditures, the firm
size, the employees’ education level, the competition conditions (intensity of price
and non-price competition), and external R&D activities such as R&D cooperation
with different business partners and institutions and/or contract (external) R&D.
Pooling data from two different sources and building differences of R&D expend-
itures and indicators for cyclical movement between two points of time led finally to
a sample of 980 available observations4 of firms with R&D activities. The basic
descriptive statistics as well as the correlation matrix of the variables used in the
econometric part are found in the Tables A1, A2, and A3, respectively.
4 The calculation of the differences between the periods 2000–2002 and 2003–2005 and between
2003–2005 and 2006–2008, respectively, is based on data for 457 firms and 523 firms, respectively.
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4. Empirical setting
4.1 Dependent variables
We classified firms according to their R&D behavior when the level of business
activity changes cyclically.5 We distinguished three basic behavior categories: non-
systematic, pro-cyclical, and anti-cyclical behavior. The group of pro-cyclically
behaving firms was further broken down in two sub-categories of asymmetric pro-
cyclical behavior: firms reacting pro-cyclically only when the economic situation
(according to the business activity indicator; see Table 1) is improving (pro-cyclical
positive) and firms reacting pro-cyclically only when the economic situation is dete-
riorating (pro-cyclical negative). Each firm in the sample was placed in one of these
categories. We used the changes of R&D intensity (R&D expenditures divided by
sales) as the criterion for distinguishing pro-cyclical, anti-cyclical, and non-system-
atic behavior. An increase of R&D intensity in boom phases or a decrease in recession
phases was denoted as “pro-cyclical” behavior. A decrease in boom phases or an
increase in recession phases was defined as “anti-cyclical” behavior. No change of
R&D intensity over the business cycle (see Table 1 for the exact definition of “no
change”) was defined as “non-systematic” behavior. According to our definition,
given that sales fluctuate—even if firm-specifically—with the business cycle, pro-
cyclical behavior does not mean that R&D expenditures just increase or decrease with
business cycle, but that they change stronger (in both directions) than sales. To take
all hypothetically possible cases into consideration, in case that sales change in the
opposite direction as the business cycle, R&D expenditures have to increase or de-
crease (less than sales) to get an increase of the R&D intensity in the boom phases
and the other way around in recession phases. For anti-cyclical behavior R&D ex-
penditures, similar arguments hold. At any rate, we need a firm-specific measure of
R&D activity that fluctuates with the industry-specific measure of business cycle to be
able to define cyclical behavior unequivocally.6 The exact definition of the dependent
variable is found in Table 1.
Based on this classification of cyclical behavior, we constructed two multinomial
variables (DEP) that served as dependent variables of the empirical model: a first one
that distinguishes three basic behavior categories (value 0: firms showing only non-
systematic behavior; value 1: firms showing only anti-cyclical behavior; value 2: firms
5 We have three single indicators (incoming orders, order backlog, and production) and one com-
posite indicator for the business activities (business activities). To build these indicators, we calcu-
lated (like usually) the net total (difference) of the percentages of positive answers of firms and the
percentages of negative answers of firms as to the relevant questions, e.g. “Did your incoming orders
increase, decrease, or remain constant?”
6 Hence, the use of the change of the value of R&D expenditures as criterion for distinguishing firm
behavior over the business cycle would be arbitrary. We thank an anonymous referee for his/her
remarks that helped us to clarify this point.
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showing only pro-cyclical behavior) and a second one that takes additionally into
consideration a refinement of pro-cyclical behavior (value 0 and 1 are defined as
aforementioned; value 2a: asymmetric positive; and value 2b: asymmetric negative
pro-cyclical behavior).
4.2 Independent variables
We regressed the two multinomial variables against a vector of independent variables
that allow testing the hypotheses (a) to (f) in Section 2 (see Table 1). The variable D
measures past demand development; a positive sign of this variable in the estimates
for anti-cyclically behaving firms is a hint that demand development might increase
the financial opportunities of firms and hence enable them to invest anti-cyclically
(hypothesis a). Additional evidence in favor of hypothesis a would yield a negative
relationship of the variable FIN,7 showing that lack of own financial resources can be
a considerable hindrance of anti-cyclical investment in R&D. Moreover, we expect
larger firms (variable FSIZE) to be able to finance R&D internally at a larger extent as
smaller firms, with the consequence that they can better use opportunity costs and
invest anti-cyclically in R&D (hypothesis b). Further, we expect anti-cyclically invest-
ing firms to use more external (innovation-relevant) knowledge (hypothesis c) and
invest more in R&D as pro-cyclically behaving firms (hypothesis d). Thus, for pro-
cyclically behaving firms, a positive sign of the variable EXT (or alternatively of any
of the variables UNIV, VERT, GROUP, or COMP referring to different types of R&D
cooperation partners) and a positive sign of the R&D/S variable, respectively, is to be
interpreted as evidence supporting hypothesis (c) and hypothesis (d), respectively.
Firms with high labor costs per employee are likely to invest pro-cyclically. Thus,
we expect a positive sign of the variable LLCOST_L in the estimates for pro-cyclically
behaving firms (hypothesis e). Firms operating under conditions of high price pres-
sure are likely to behave pro-cyclically with respect to R&D intensity (hypothesis f).
Thus, a positive sign of the variable IPC in the estimates for pro-cyclically behaving
firms can be interpreted as evidence in favor of hypothesis (f). We also include in our
model a further competition variable referring to the non-price dimensions of com-
petition (variable INPC), for which we expect the opposite sign as for price compe-
tition.8 We also include in our model controls for the high-tech sector and the year,
in which the survey has taken place.
7 In the questionnaire, we asked whether a firm lacks own funds for innovation activities. The firm
could give an answer based on a five-point Likert-scale (1: ‘not important’; 5: ‘very important’).
8 IPC measures the intensity of price competition in the main sales market of a firm based on a five-
point Likert scale. The question goes as follows: “Assess the intensity of competition in your main
sales market according to prices and according to non-price competition dimensions (product
differentiation, frequent introduction of new products, flexibility in serving customers wishes, ser-
vices, technical advance).”
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In sum, we estimate the following equations:
DEPit ¼ 0 þ 1R&D=Sit1 þ 2Dit1 þ 3FINit1 þ 4LLCOST_Lit1
þ 5SHORT_RDit1 þ 6EXT_NETit1 þ 7IPCit1 þ 8INPCit1
þ 9FSIZEit1 þ 10HIGHTECHi þ 11TDUM_05i þ eit
ð1Þ
DEPit ¼ 0 þ 1R&D=Sit1 þ 2Dit1 þ 3FINit1 þ 4LLCOST_Lit1
þ 5SHORT_RDit1 þ 6UNIVit1 þ 8VERTit1
þ 9GROUPit1 þ 10COMPit1 þ 11IPCit1 þ 12INPCit1
þ 13FSIZEit1 þ 14HIGHTECHi þ 15TDUM_05i þ eit
ð2Þ
DEPit ¼ "ð0,1,2Þ
or
DEPit ¼ "ð0,1,2a,2bÞ
DEP is the multinomial dependent variable (exclusive categories) that predetermines
also the econometric method to be used. We applied a multinomial probit estimator
(“mprobit” procedure in STATA), at which the independent variables are lagged one
period. Hence, we are estimating the relationship between the DEP (measuring how
R&D intensity responses to business cycle fluctuation) in a certain period t and the
firm characteristics in the period t-1. This setting prevents that our estimations are
driven by endogeneity of R&D/S (reverse causality).9 Furthermore, following Greene
(2003: 727), the IIA (independence of irrelevant alternatives) rule does not apply, as
we use the multinomial probit estimator.10
5. R&D and business cycle development in Swiss
manufacturing 1999–2009: The main facts
The three business indicators (incoming orders, order backlog, and production) as
well as the composite indicator for economic activity in the Swiss manufacturing
sector in the period 1999–2009 show a strong cyclical pattern with two peaks in 2000
and 2007, respectively, and two troughs in 2002 and 2009, respectively (Figure 1).
Almost all of the 30 three-digit industries considered in this study show a similar
cyclical pattern. There are some exceptions (e.g. pharmaceutical industry), but they
are too few to affect the overall picture.
9 Other types of endogeneity (omitted variable bias) cannot be adequately addressed owing to the
lack of instruments.
10 We also applied a random effects multinomial logit estimator. The results are similar. However,
the random effects multinomial logit model does not fulfil the IIA (independence of irrelevant
alternatives) assumption.
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Table 2 shows the shares of firms that behave differently with respect to R&D
investment when the overall business conditions change (see Table 1 for the defin-
ition of pro-cyclical, anti-cyclical, and non-systematic behavior). About 42% of all
firms with R&D activities behave pro-cyclically, only 17% behave anti-cyclically, and
the rest (40%) shows no systematic behavior with respect to cyclicality. Pro-cyc-
lically reacting firms show an asymmetric behavior. In all, 83% of them react only to
positive changes of the overall business conditions, 17% only to negative changes of
the overall economic activity. Economically relevant is the fact that there is consid-
erable behavior variety (heterogeneity) in our sample that allows testing alternative
hypotheses.
Table 3 shows the distribution of the various behavior categories by industry. In
every industry, we found more pro-cyclical behaving than anti-cyclical behaving
firms. But there are four industries, in which the group of firms with “non-system-
atic” behavior is the largest one: wood processing, printing, metal working, and other
manufacturing, all four of them rather low-tech industries with a low R&D intensity.
In two more industries are the groups of firms with “non-systematic” behavior and
pro-cyclical behavior about of the same magnitude: food and glass, stone, clay, and
also industries with a low R&D intensity. Finally, machinery and electronics/instru-
ments, two of the most innovative industries in Switzerland, show relatively high
-
60
-
40
-
20
0
20
40
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Year
Business_activity Incoming_orders
Order_backlog Production
Figure 1 Business indicators 1999–2009. Vertical axis shows the net total (difference) of
percentages of firms that answered positive to the respective question (e.g. “Did your incom-
ing orders increase, decrease or remain constant?”) and percentage of firms that answered
negative.
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Table 2 Business cycle and firm behavior with respect to R&D intensity
Behavior N Percentage share
Non-systematic 396 40.41
Anti-cyclical 171 17.45
Pro-cyclical Pro-cyclical/negative 72 7.35
Pro-cyclical/positive 341 34.80
Total 980 100
The calculation of the differences between the periods 2000–2002 and 2003–2005 and between
2003–2005 and 2006–2008, respectively, are based on data for 457 firms and 523 firms, re-
spectively. See Table 1 for the definition of the variables.
Table 3 Firms with pro-cyclical, anti-cyclical, or non-systematic behavior as to R&D intensity
by industry (number of observations 2002, 2005)
Industry Non-systematic Anti-cyclical Pro-cyclical Total
Pro-cyclical
negative
Pro-cyclical
positive
Food, beverage, tobacco 36 6 10 28 80
Textiles 7 9 0 16 32
Clothing 2 2 0 2 6
Wood processing 19 5 0 14 38
Paper 8 3 0 11 22
Printing 37 5 7 20 69
Chemicals 7 19 0 36 62
Plastics, rubber 38 4 0 10 52
Glass, stone, clay 22 7 0 15 44
Metal 7 4 0 6 17
Metal working 93 7 2 45 147
Machinery 54 37 34 60 185
Electrical machinery 11 15 0 18 44
Electronics, instruments 65 52 34 78 229
Transportation vehicles 6 3 1 3 13
Other manufacturing 19 3 0 8 30
Total 396 171 72 341 980
See Table 1 for the definition of the variables.
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shares of firms with that react pro-cyclically only to negative changes of economic
conditions.
6. Empirical results
6.1 Some descriptive results
Table 4 shows how the most important innovation-relevant characteristics used in
this study are distributed among the three main categories of cyclical behavior and
the two sub-groups of pro-cyclically behaving firms. Both price and non-price pres-
sure is experienced primarily by firms behaving non-systematically and those with
negative-pro-cyclical behavior. The latter fact is in accordance with theoretical
expectation. External contacts for knowledge acquisition are more frequent for posi-
tive-pro-cyclically behaving firms than for anti-cyclically operating firms (i.e. con-
trary to theoretical expectation), but they are more frequent for anti-cyclically
behaving firms than for those operating negative-anti-cyclically (i.e. in accordance
to theoretical expectations). Thus, there is much behavior heterogeneity that has to
be taken into account in the empirical analysis. A similar pattern as for the overall
variable “external contacts” is found also for the single cooperation partners (uni-
versities, suppliers/clients, competitors, and firms of the same group).
6.2 Econometric results
The results in Table 5 (columns 2 and 4) show that in our sample, pro-cyclically
behaving firms are more likely to pay higher wages (LCOST_L) and operate in
markets with a high price pressure (IPC) than anti-cyclically behaving firms (refer-
ence group). Thus, the hypotheses (e) and (f) seem to be backed by the estimates. No
differences between pro-cyclical and anti-cyclical behavior could be found with re-
spect to non-price competition (INPC).
Further, we see that the likelihood of pro-cyclical behavior is related to lower R&D
intensity (R&D/S), and a significantly drop in past demand development (D) is also
more likely to be related to pro-cyclical rather than anti-cyclically firm behavior (see
Filippetti and Archibugi, 2011). Looking at these results from the point of view of
anti-cyclical behavior, it appears that the hypotheses (a) and (d), respectively, are
confirmed.11 No difference as to lack of internal financial resources (FIN) was found
between pro-cyclical and anti-cyclically behaving firms. The lack of internal finance
resources appears to be a problem rather for non-systematic than for anti-cyclical
behavior. Hypothesis (d) receives only partly additional support by the results for the
11 R&D has a “structural” component that tends to be rigid along the business cycle (equipment, on-
going long-term projects). However, our findings confirm hypothesis (d), which means that firms
with a larger sales share of R&D investments are likely to invest anti-cyclically.
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variable FIN. The variable SHORT_RD did not show any effect in all estimates in
Tables 5 and 6.
We do not find any difference between anti-cyclical and pro-cyclical behavior
with respect to firm size (FSIZE). Larger firms do not seem to be stronger inclined
to anti-cyclical behavior than smaller ones, as it is postulated in hypothesis (b).
However, this hypothesis receives some support when anti-cyclical behavior is com-
pared with non-systematic behavior (column 1): the likelihood of behaving non-
systematically is negatively correlated with firm size or the other way around the
likelihood of anti-cyclical behavior is positively correlated with firm size.
According to hypothesis (c), it is expected that the acquisition of external know-
ledge (EXT_NET) is a characteristic for anti-cyclical investment behavior of firms.
Table 5 Innovation-relevant characteristics of firms with pro-cyclical, anti-cyclical or non-
systematic behavior with respect to R&D intensity; manufacturing; 2000–2008
Variable 0: non-systematic 2: pro-cyclical 0: non-systematic 2: pro-cyclical
R&D/S 22.347*** (3.109) 6.013*** (1.823) 27.000*** (3.166) 6.543*** (1.812)
D 0.093 (0.071) 0.174*** (0.068) 0.120* (0.071) 0.189*** (0.069)
FIN 0.103* (0.062) 0.016 (0.059) 0.123** (0.062) 0.025 (0.059)
LLCOST_L 0.208 (0.258) 0.428* (0.244) 0.044 (0.257) 0.413* (0.245)
SHORT_RD 0.041 (0.066) 0.042 (0.062) 0.062 (0.065) 0.045 (0.062)
EXT_NET 1.015*** (0.174) 0.102 (0.160)
UNIV 0.574* (0.345) 0.538* (0.292)
VERT 0.215 (0.318) 0.165 (0.270)
GROUP 0.906*** (0.322) 0.349 (0.266)
COMP 0.278 (0.364) 0.144 (0.302)
IPC 0.159** (0.079) 0.154** (0.075) 0.147* (0.079) 0.145** (0.075)
INPC 0.094 (0.094) 0.026 (0.089) 0.137 (0.093) 0.028 (0.088)
FSIZE 0.115** (0.062) 0.066 (0.058) 0.170*** (0.062) 0.065 (0.058)
HIGHTECH 0.428*** (0.161) 0.131 (0.154) 0.431*** (0.161) 0.132 (0.155)
TDUM_05 0.713*** (0.156) 0.712*** (0.147) 0.693*** (0.155) 0.727*** (0.148)
Constant 0.130 (2.889) 4.272 (2.735) 1.991*** (2.867) 4.104 (2.743)
N 980 977
Wald chi2 281.6*** 260.2***
Log L 830.6 841.8
Pseudo R2 0.004 0.006
Multinomial probit estimates; reference group: 1: anti-cyclical.
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, or 10% test level, respectively.
The results are based on data for 457 firms and 523 firms for the periods 2000–2002 and 2003–
2005 and 2003–2005 and 2006–2008, respectively.
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This is the case only when anti-cyclical behavior is compared with non-systematic
behavior, but not when compared with anti-cyclical behavior. Hence, hypothesis (c)
is only partly confirmed. There is some rather weak evidence that pro-cyclical and
no-systematic behavior is related to the use of university knowledge (columns 3 and
4 in Table 5), which is contrary to hypothesis (c). The more refined results in Table 6,
column 6, show that the university knowledge effect holds primarily for the positive-
pro-cyclically behaving firms (see later in the text). The negative effect of EXT_NET
is traced back to the use of knowledge from firms of the same firm group or firm
conglomerate (GROUP).
Finally, firms in the high-tech sector of the manufacturing sector (HIGHTECH)
are more likely to be found among anti-cyclically behaving firms than among non-
systematically behaving firms, but no difference with respect to the affiliation to the
high-tech sector was found between anti-cyclically and pro-cyclically behaving firms.
The likelihood of behaving pro-cyclically has been significantly higher in the period
beginning with 2005 than in the earlier period beginning with 2002, when compared
with anti-cyclical behavior.
Some additional insights are gained when pro-cyclical behavior is broken down to
positive-pro-cyclical behavior for firms reacting pro-cyclically only when the eco-
nomic situation is improving (boom) and negative-pro-cyclical behavior for firms
reacting pro-cyclically only when the economic situation is deteriorating (trough).
The results in Table 6 show that the effects of demand development and R&D in-
tensity are found for both sub-categories of pro-cyclical behavior. Thus, the hypoth-
eses (a) and (d) are holding on a wide basis. The effect of high labor costs per
employee (LLCOST_L) comes primarily from firms with a negative-pro-cyclical
behavior, and the price competition effect (IPC) is traced back primarily to the
positive-pro-cyclical behaving firms. Hence, these results lead to a (data-driven)
refinement of the hypotheses (e) and (f), each of them holding for a specific sub-
group of pro-cyclically behaving firms.
The more detailed results for various R&D cooperation partners in Table 6 (col-
umns 5 and 6) show—as already aforementioned—a positive university knowledge
effect for positive-pro-cyclically behaving firms as compared with anti-cyclically
behaving firms that is contrary to theoretical expectations. Thus, the flexibility
effect of R&D cooperation as postulated in hypothesis (c) does not hold for the
cooperation with universities. A further result is the negative effect of horizontal
R&D cooperation, which is in accordance with theoretical expectations, but it did
not show with the overall variable for external knowledge EXT_NET (see Table 5,
column 3).
In Table A4, we investigate R&D/S, which is an important factor for the cyclical
behavior of firms, in greater detail. The results in Table 5 show a positive correlation
between R&D/S and the probability for anti-cyclical R&D investments. The predicted
probability of R&D/S yields some interesting further insights. The probability of anti-
cyclical behavior increases steadily with increased values for R&D/S. For instance,
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holding other variables at their mean values, the probability of showing an anti-
cyclical behavior amounts to 17%, if a firm invests 2% of its sales in R&D. If R&D/S
increases to 6%, the probability for anti-cyclical behavior increases to 27%; with an
R&D/S of 24%, the probability increases to 67%. Further, Table A4 shows that the
probability of having non-systematic R&D investment behavior or a pro-cyclical
R&D investment behavior decreases with increasing R&D/S rates. It is remarkable
that the probabilities for pro-cyclical behavior start to decrease with a rather high
R&D/S investment rate of 10%.
7. Conclusions
New elements of our analysis are as follows: (i) the identification in our data of three
main types of R&D investment behavior, namely, anti-cyclical, pro-cyclical, and non-
systematic with respect to the fluctuation of overall economic activity as measured by
a standard composite indicator of the business conditions at industry level and (ii)
the investigation of a series of hypotheses as to innovation-relevant firm character-
istics that underline the three different behavior categories.
About 42% of all firms with R&D activities behave pro-cyclically, only 17%
behave anti-cyclically, and the rest (40%) shows no systematic behavior with re-
spect to cyclicality. Economically relevant is the fact that there is considerable
behavior variety in our sample that allows testing alternative hypotheses.
To this end, we analyzed a number of factors that have a pro-cyclical or anti-
cyclical effect on R&D investments or innovative behavior. In sum, we found that
firms can benefit from low opportunity costs through anti-cyclical R&D investments
if: (i) they are confronted with stronger demand effects (compared with anti-cyclical
behavior; hypothesis a); (ii) they have a relatively large sales share of R&D expend-
itures (hypothesis d); (iii) they have external R&D relationships (only compared with
non-systematic behavior, thus only partial confirmation of hypothesis c); (iv) they
have rather low average labor costs (compared with pro-cyclical behavior; hypoth-
esis f); (v) they are not exposed to intensive price competition (e.g. because they
operate in international market niches; hypothesis e); (vi) they are relatively large
(hypothesis b); and (vii) they belong to high-tech industries. An additional charac-
teristic of anti-cyclical behaving firms is that compared with pro-cyclical firms, par-
ticularly positive-pro-cyclically operating firms, they are less frequently cooperating
with universities.
From a policy point of view, the results indicate that innovation policy can con-
tribute to mitigate the cyclical fluctuation of R&D investments through considering
the just mentioned factors in their promotion activities. For the specific case of R&D
expenditures, we learnt that the predicted probability of an anti-cyclical behavior
considerably increases at relatively high levels of sales share of R&D investments. In
sum, an anti-cyclical R&D investment behavior would not only help firms make use
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of lower opportunity costs at recessions but also contribute to dampen the overall
business fluctuation.
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Appendix
Table A1 Descriptive statistics
Variable N Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
D 980 2.993 1.093 1 5
FIN 980 2.389 1.320 1 5
SHORT_D 980 2.240 1.198 1 5
LLCOST_L 980 11.270 0.313 8.517 12.432
FSIZE 980 4.095 1.364 0 8.882
INPC 980 3.169 0.855 1 5
IPC 980 4.049 0.963 1 5
EXT 980 0.393 0.489 0 1
R&D/S 980 0.018 0.038 0 0.498
UNIV 977 0.123 0.328 0 1
VERT 977 0.165 0.371 0 1
GROUP 977 0.120 0.325 0 1
COMP 977 0.060 0.238 0 1
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Table A2 Categorical variables and share of observations
Variable Proportion Standard error 95% confidence
interval
D
1 0.097 0.009 0.078–0.115
2 0.240 0.014 0.213–0.267
3 0.306 0.015 0.277–0.335
4 0.288 0.014 0.259–0.316
5 0.069 0.008 0.053–0.085
FIN
1 0.355 0.015 0.325–0.385
2 0.219 0.013 0.193–0.245
3 0.186 0.012 0.161–0.210
4 0.161 0.012 0.138–0.184
5 0.079 0.009 0.062–0.095
SHORT_D
1 0.372 0.015 0.342–0.403
2 0.232 0.013 0.205–0.258
3 0.216 0.013 0.191–0.242
4 0.143 0.011 0.121–0.165
5 0.037 0.006 0.025–0.049
INPC
1 0.037 0.006 0.025–0.049
2 0.154 0.012 0.131–0.177
3 0.433 0.016 0.402–0.464
4 0.329 0.015 0.299–0.358
5 0.048 0.007 0.035–0.061
IPC
1 0.013 0.004 0.006–0.020
2 0.068 0.008 0.053–0.084
3 0.155 0.012 0.132–0.178
4 0.383 0.016 0.352–0.413
5 0.381 0.016 0.350–0.411
Number of observations 980.
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Table A4 Predicted probabilities for several R&D/S values
R&D/S Delta-method
Predicted
probability
Standard
error
z P4 z
OUTCOME 0 (non-systematic)
0.20 0.380 0.015 24.89 0.000
0.60 0.223 0.030 7.48 0.000
1.00 0.109 0.033 3.29 0.001
1.40 0.042 0.023 1.81 0.070
1.60 0.013 0.011 1.12 0.262
2.00 0.003 0.004 0.75 0.453
2.40 0.000 0.001 0.53 0.594
OUTCOME 1 (anti-cyclical firms)
0.20 0.170 0.012 13.87 0.000
0.60 0.270 0.023 11.78 0.000
1.00 0.373 0.041 9.03 0.000
1.40 0.465 0.061 7.64 0.000
1.60 0.543 0.080 6.83 0.000
2.00 0.611 0.096 6.39 0.000
2.40 0.672 0.108 6.22 0.000
OUTCOME 2 (pro-cyclical)
0.20 0.450 0.016 28.67 0.000
0.60 0.506 0.028 18.24 0.000
1.00 0.519 0.043 12.17 0.000
1.40 0.493 0.060 8.18 0.000
1.60 0.444 0.079 5.63 0.000
2.00 0.386 0.095 4.05 0.000
2.40 0.328 0.108 3.04 0.002
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